This document summarizes my experience, challenges and eventually research to find the best possible methodology for risk assessment. I would like to highlight that I have taken extensive support from different LLM models, in pursuit of writing this article
A. Elicitation and group cognition
| Structured brainstorming |
Facilitated generation of candidate risks by a group against a prompt set |
IEC 31010:2019 ◐ · ISO 31000 “inclusive” |
As the only method; for a single high-consequence event |
Default first pass of any cycle |
| Semi-structured interviews |
One-to-one questioning with open prompts to surface tacit knowledge |
IEC 31010:2019 ◐ |
When breadth is needed quickly; as the sole method |
Capturing work-as-done before the workshop |
| Delphi method |
Iterative anonymous expert rounds converging on a judgement and its dispersion |
IEC 31010:2019 ◐ |
When speed matters; when consensus will be manufactured |
Low-frequency risks where experts disagree |
| Nominal group technique |
Silent individual generation, then structured ranking for equal airtime |
[P] |
When novel, imaginative risk is the goal |
Fair ranking in hierarchy-heavy cultures |
| Brainwriting (6-3-5) |
Written ideas passed around in timed rounds, then collected |
[P] |
When the prompt set is absent |
Large groups with dominant personalities |
| Pre-mortem |
Team assumes the plan failed and works backwards to the causes |
[P] (Klein) |
For routine operational risk; without a real facilitator |
Stress-testing a plan before approval |
| Red teaming |
An independent group structured to challenge a plan or assumption set |
[P] · NIST SP 800-115 ◐ |
As tokenism; without independence |
Challenging bids, security and strategy |
| War-gaming / simulation |
Immersive exercise testing decisions against a running scenario |
[P] |
When findings must be generalisable |
Crisis response and escalation paths |
| Observation / shadowing |
Direct watching of work-as-done to find drift from procedure |
[P] · ISO 45001 ◐ |
When breadth is needed quickly |
Verifying work-as-done in the field |
| Crowdsourcing / near-miss reporting |
Frontline submission channels aggregating many small signals |
ISO 45001 ◐ · [P] |
Without triage capacity; in a blame culture |
Dispersed field operations at volume |
B. Prompt and context
| Risk taxonomy / prompt list |
Structured categories that prompt recall across the risk universe |
COSO 2017 Principle 6 ◐ · ISO 31000 6.4.2 ◐ · [P] |
Alone — yields categories, not events; when stale or unowned |
The backbone, paired with any method |
| Checklists / questionnaires |
Fixed lists applied systematically to a defined scope |
IEC 31010:2019 ◐ |
For novel or emerging risk |
Auditing completeness of a known scope |
| PESTLE |
Scan of external drivers across six lenses |
[P] · ISO 31000 6.3.3 ◐ |
For specific events or internal detail |
Strategy-level external scanning |
| SWOT |
Matrix of internal strengths/weaknesses, external opportunities/threats |
[P] |
As an identification method at all |
Opening a strategy conversation |
| Futures wheel / horizon scanning |
Mapping second/third-order consequences; tracking weak signals |
[P] · ISO 31000 “best available information” |
For near-term, verifiable risk |
Emerging and third-order consequences |
| Morphological / cross-impact |
Systematic combination of variables to generate futures |
IEC 31010:2019 ◐ |
Without a triage gate |
Systematic futures for tech/regulation |
C. Structured deviation and hazard
| HAZID (Hazard Identification) |
Structured hazard identification within a defined scope using guidewords |
[P] · ISO 17776 ◐ |
For ongoing operations; for commercial risk |
Early design of a physical site or process |
| SWIFT (Structured What-If) |
Team applies what-if guidewords to a process or change |
IEC 31010:2019 ◐ |
For complex interacting systems |
Projects and change, fast and cheap |
| HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) |
Node-by-node deviation analysis via parameter + guideword pairs |
IEC 61882:2016 ◐ |
For simple systems (overkill); for people factors alone |
Complex interconnected process systems |
| JSA / task risk assessment |
Task broken into steps; hazard and control per step |
ISO 45001 ◐ · [P] |
For enterprise or systemic risk |
Every maintenance task, every permit |
| Hierarchical task analysis |
Task decomposed into subtasks to locate error points |
IEC 62508:2010 ◐ · [P] |
Without field validation |
Error points in maintenance procedures |
D. Failure-mode and causal
| FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) |
Bottom-up listing of component failure modes, effects and detection |
IEC 60812:2018 |
For high-level enterprise risk; for cross-system interaction |
Maintenance planning for critical assets |
| FMECA (FMEA + Criticality) |
FMEA plus a criticality ranking of each failure mode |
IEC 60812:2018 |
Before the FMEA data exists |
Spares and capital prioritisation |
| Fault tree analysis |
Top-down logic diagram of how a top event could occur |
IEC 61025:2006 |
For broad identification (needs a defined top event) |
Verifying defences for a known worst case |
| Event tree analysis |
Forward logic from an initiator through successive safeguards |
IEC 62502:2010 ◐ |
For unimagined initiators |
Consequences of a defined initiator |
| LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) |
Semi-quantitative check that protection layers reduce risk to target |
IEC 61511 ◐ · CCPS [P] |
For vague scenarios without defined layers |
Justifying treatment for high-hazard scenarios |
| Bow-tie |
Causes left, event centre, consequences right, controls each side |
IEC 31010:2019 ◐ · Energy Institute [P] |
For aggregate/portfolio view |
Communicating one serious event and its controls |
| Barrier analysis |
Map of defences and where they are degraded or absent |
[P] (Reason) · Energy Institute |
For emergent, dynamic interaction |
Verifying the control stack on a bow-tie |
| Root cause analysis |
Structured trace from an event back to its causal factors |
IEC 62740:2015 ◐ · ISO 45001 |
For future/emerging risk; for single-cause certainty |
Post-incident and near-miss learning |
| HRA (Human Reliability Analysis) |
Analysis of error-prone tasks and human error likelihood |
IEC 62508:2010 ◐ · HEART/SPAR-H [P] |
For non-safety-critical work; for false precision |
Error-prone safety-critical tasks |
| RCM (Reliability Centred Maintenance) |
Determines failure modes and the maintenance each justifies |
IEC 60300-3-11:2009 ◐ · SAE JA1011 |
For low-criticality assets; without an asset hierarchy |
Asset-intensive renewal planning |
| Common cause failure analysis |
Finds shared dependencies that defeat redundancy |
IEC 61508/61511 ◐ · [P] |
Without accurate dependency mapping |
Power, control and monitoring redundancy |
E. Model and systems
| Scenario analysis / stress testing |
Narratives or quantified shocks of plausible futures |
IEC 31010:2019 ◐ · TCFD/ISSB ◐ |
For precise likelihood; for operational detail |
Exploring what has not happened yet |
| Reverse stress testing |
Starts from failure and identifies conditions that would cause it |
[R] PRA/EIOPA · [P] |
For routine risk; without board support |
Finding what must be true for failure |
| Causal loop / system dynamics |
Maps feedback loops and simulates behaviour over time |
[P] (Forrester) |
For discrete event identification |
Feedback and unintended consequences |
| FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis) |
Models how function variability propagates through a system |
[P] (Hollnagel) |
For conventional systems; without training |
Complex socio-technical variability |
| STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) |
Identifies unsafe control actions in a control-structure model |
[P] (Leveson) · ISO 21448 ◐ |
For simple systems; without a trained analyst |
Software-intensive, automated systems |
F. Data-driven
| Incident / near-miss analysis |
Mining past events and near-misses for recurring causes |
ISO 31000 6.6 ◐ · ISO 45001 · COSO Principle 9 |
For risks that have never occurred |
The corrective to group memory — every cycle |
| Audit, inspection and condition data |
Using assurance findings and asset condition as evidence |
ISO 31000 6.6 ◐ · ISO 55001 · Three Lines Model |
For the unknown — the scope is your boundary |
Evidence of what is already failing |
| Telemetry / anomaly detection |
Automated detection of precursors in sensor data |
[P] · ISO 55001 ◐ |
Without data quality; for un-instrumented assets |
Early warning across an asset fleet |
| Text mining of logs |
Statistical extraction of patterns from unstructured records |
[P] |
For small volumes; for causal certainty |
Patterns in field tickets and complaints |
G. Domain regimes — the better source, not ISO 31000
| Threat modelling / TVRA |
Maps threat sources, vulnerabilities and attack paths |
ISO/IEC 27005 ◐ · NIST SP 800-30 · NIST SP 800-154 · CPNI [R] |
For non-security risk; restricted circulation |
Physical and cyber security of sites |
| BIA (Business Impact Analysis) |
Quantifies time-based impact of disruption per activity |
ISO 22301:2019 |
For threat identification (impact only) |
Recovery-time prioritisation |
| Compliance obligation register |
Lists obligations mapped to controls and owners |
ISO 37301:2021 |
For voluntary/reputational exposure |
Consent- and licence-driven identification |
| Third-party / concentration |
Maps dependency and substitutability across supply tiers |
ISO 37500:2014 ◐ · [P] |
Beyond tier-1 visibility |
Supply-side single points of failure |
| DPIA (Data Protection Impact Assessment) |
Assesses privacy harms of a processing activity |
GDPR art. 35 · ISO 27701 ◐ |
For non-privacy risk |
New monitoring and data-sharing |
| Environmental & social impact |
Evaluates external impacts of a project or change |
[R] national law · IFC Performance Standards · ISO 14001 |
For cumulative or enterprise-wide risk |
Greenfield and community-facing builds |
| Climate scenario analysis |
Assesses physical and transition risk under climate futures |
TCFD · ISSB IFRS S2 |
For short-horizon operational risk |
Physical/transition risk, asset resilience |
| Fraud risk assessment |
Identifies fraud schemes mapped to processes and roles |
COSO Fraud Risk Management Guide 2016 · IIA |
Without fraud expertise |
Procurement, payments, fuel, payroll |
No new verification items are introduced by this change — the standing list applies unchanged (IEC 31010:2019 annex letters, IEC 61882, IEC 60812, IEC 61025, IEC 62502, IEC 62740, IEC 60300-3-11, ISO 22301, ISO 37301, ISO 37500, ISO 45001, ISO 55001, ISO/IEC 27005, and ISO 31000:2018 at 6.3.3, 6.4.2 and 6.6). If useful, the next step is to turn this into a single deliverable document with a short selection flowchart on top.