Risk Assessment - How to identify the risk

Author

Ahsan Iftikhar

Published

January 1, 2027

This document summarizes my experience, challenges and eventually research to find the best possible methodology for risk assessment. I would like to highlight that I have taken extensive support from different LLM models, in pursuit of writing this article

A. Elicitation and group cognition

Methodology Description Reference When NOT to use Most suitable for
Structured brainstorming Facilitated generation of candidate risks by a group against a prompt set IEC 31010:2019 ◐ · ISO 31000 “inclusive” As the only method; for a single high-consequence event Default first pass of any cycle
Semi-structured interviews One-to-one questioning with open prompts to surface tacit knowledge IEC 31010:2019 ◐ When breadth is needed quickly; as the sole method Capturing work-as-done before the workshop
Delphi method Iterative anonymous expert rounds converging on a judgement and its dispersion IEC 31010:2019 ◐ When speed matters; when consensus will be manufactured Low-frequency risks where experts disagree
Nominal group technique Silent individual generation, then structured ranking for equal airtime [P] When novel, imaginative risk is the goal Fair ranking in hierarchy-heavy cultures
Brainwriting (6-3-5) Written ideas passed around in timed rounds, then collected [P] When the prompt set is absent Large groups with dominant personalities
Pre-mortem Team assumes the plan failed and works backwards to the causes [P] (Klein) For routine operational risk; without a real facilitator Stress-testing a plan before approval
Red teaming An independent group structured to challenge a plan or assumption set [P] · NIST SP 800-115 ◐ As tokenism; without independence Challenging bids, security and strategy
War-gaming / simulation Immersive exercise testing decisions against a running scenario [P] When findings must be generalisable Crisis response and escalation paths
Observation / shadowing Direct watching of work-as-done to find drift from procedure [P] · ISO 45001 ◐ When breadth is needed quickly Verifying work-as-done in the field
Crowdsourcing / near-miss reporting Frontline submission channels aggregating many small signals ISO 45001 ◐ · [P] Without triage capacity; in a blame culture Dispersed field operations at volume

B. Prompt and context

Methodology Description Reference When NOT to use Most suitable for
Risk taxonomy / prompt list Structured categories that prompt recall across the risk universe COSO 2017 Principle 6 ◐ · ISO 31000 6.4.2 ◐ · [P] Alone — yields categories, not events; when stale or unowned The backbone, paired with any method
Checklists / questionnaires Fixed lists applied systematically to a defined scope IEC 31010:2019 ◐ For novel or emerging risk Auditing completeness of a known scope
PESTLE Scan of external drivers across six lenses [P] · ISO 31000 6.3.3 ◐ For specific events or internal detail Strategy-level external scanning
SWOT Matrix of internal strengths/weaknesses, external opportunities/threats [P] As an identification method at all Opening a strategy conversation
Futures wheel / horizon scanning Mapping second/third-order consequences; tracking weak signals [P] · ISO 31000 “best available information” For near-term, verifiable risk Emerging and third-order consequences
Morphological / cross-impact Systematic combination of variables to generate futures IEC 31010:2019 ◐ Without a triage gate Systematic futures for tech/regulation

C. Structured deviation and hazard

Methodology Description Reference When NOT to use Most suitable for
HAZID (Hazard Identification) Structured hazard identification within a defined scope using guidewords [P] · ISO 17776 ◐ For ongoing operations; for commercial risk Early design of a physical site or process
SWIFT (Structured What-If) Team applies what-if guidewords to a process or change IEC 31010:2019 ◐ For complex interacting systems Projects and change, fast and cheap
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) Node-by-node deviation analysis via parameter + guideword pairs IEC 61882:2016 ◐ For simple systems (overkill); for people factors alone Complex interconnected process systems
JSA / task risk assessment Task broken into steps; hazard and control per step ISO 45001 ◐ · [P] For enterprise or systemic risk Every maintenance task, every permit
Hierarchical task analysis Task decomposed into subtasks to locate error points IEC 62508:2010 ◐ · [P] Without field validation Error points in maintenance procedures

D. Failure-mode and causal

Methodology Description Reference When NOT to use Most suitable for
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) Bottom-up listing of component failure modes, effects and detection IEC 60812:2018 For high-level enterprise risk; for cross-system interaction Maintenance planning for critical assets
FMECA (FMEA + Criticality) FMEA plus a criticality ranking of each failure mode IEC 60812:2018 Before the FMEA data exists Spares and capital prioritisation
Fault tree analysis Top-down logic diagram of how a top event could occur IEC 61025:2006 For broad identification (needs a defined top event) Verifying defences for a known worst case
Event tree analysis Forward logic from an initiator through successive safeguards IEC 62502:2010 ◐ For unimagined initiators Consequences of a defined initiator
LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) Semi-quantitative check that protection layers reduce risk to target IEC 61511 ◐ · CCPS [P] For vague scenarios without defined layers Justifying treatment for high-hazard scenarios
Bow-tie Causes left, event centre, consequences right, controls each side IEC 31010:2019 ◐ · Energy Institute [P] For aggregate/portfolio view Communicating one serious event and its controls
Barrier analysis Map of defences and where they are degraded or absent [P] (Reason) · Energy Institute For emergent, dynamic interaction Verifying the control stack on a bow-tie
Root cause analysis Structured trace from an event back to its causal factors IEC 62740:2015 ◐ · ISO 45001 For future/emerging risk; for single-cause certainty Post-incident and near-miss learning
HRA (Human Reliability Analysis) Analysis of error-prone tasks and human error likelihood IEC 62508:2010 ◐ · HEART/SPAR-H [P] For non-safety-critical work; for false precision Error-prone safety-critical tasks
RCM (Reliability Centred Maintenance) Determines failure modes and the maintenance each justifies IEC 60300-3-11:2009 ◐ · SAE JA1011 For low-criticality assets; without an asset hierarchy Asset-intensive renewal planning
Common cause failure analysis Finds shared dependencies that defeat redundancy IEC 61508/61511 ◐ · [P] Without accurate dependency mapping Power, control and monitoring redundancy

E. Model and systems

Methodology Description Reference When NOT to use Most suitable for
Scenario analysis / stress testing Narratives or quantified shocks of plausible futures IEC 31010:2019 ◐ · TCFD/ISSB ◐ For precise likelihood; for operational detail Exploring what has not happened yet
Reverse stress testing Starts from failure and identifies conditions that would cause it [R] PRA/EIOPA · [P] For routine risk; without board support Finding what must be true for failure
Causal loop / system dynamics Maps feedback loops and simulates behaviour over time [P] (Forrester) For discrete event identification Feedback and unintended consequences
FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis) Models how function variability propagates through a system [P] (Hollnagel) For conventional systems; without training Complex socio-technical variability
STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) Identifies unsafe control actions in a control-structure model [P] (Leveson) · ISO 21448 ◐ For simple systems; without a trained analyst Software-intensive, automated systems

F. Data-driven

Methodology Description Reference When NOT to use Most suitable for
Incident / near-miss analysis Mining past events and near-misses for recurring causes ISO 31000 6.6 ◐ · ISO 45001 · COSO Principle 9 For risks that have never occurred The corrective to group memory — every cycle
Audit, inspection and condition data Using assurance findings and asset condition as evidence ISO 31000 6.6 ◐ · ISO 55001 · Three Lines Model For the unknown — the scope is your boundary Evidence of what is already failing
Telemetry / anomaly detection Automated detection of precursors in sensor data [P] · ISO 55001 ◐ Without data quality; for un-instrumented assets Early warning across an asset fleet
Text mining of logs Statistical extraction of patterns from unstructured records [P] For small volumes; for causal certainty Patterns in field tickets and complaints

G. Domain regimes — the better source, not ISO 31000

Methodology Description Reference When NOT to use Most suitable for
Threat modelling / TVRA Maps threat sources, vulnerabilities and attack paths ISO/IEC 27005 ◐ · NIST SP 800-30 · NIST SP 800-154 · CPNI [R] For non-security risk; restricted circulation Physical and cyber security of sites
BIA (Business Impact Analysis) Quantifies time-based impact of disruption per activity ISO 22301:2019 For threat identification (impact only) Recovery-time prioritisation
Compliance obligation register Lists obligations mapped to controls and owners ISO 37301:2021 For voluntary/reputational exposure Consent- and licence-driven identification
Third-party / concentration Maps dependency and substitutability across supply tiers ISO 37500:2014 ◐ · [P] Beyond tier-1 visibility Supply-side single points of failure
DPIA (Data Protection Impact Assessment) Assesses privacy harms of a processing activity GDPR art. 35 · ISO 27701 ◐ For non-privacy risk New monitoring and data-sharing
Environmental & social impact Evaluates external impacts of a project or change [R] national law · IFC Performance Standards · ISO 14001 For cumulative or enterprise-wide risk Greenfield and community-facing builds
Climate scenario analysis Assesses physical and transition risk under climate futures TCFD · ISSB IFRS S2 For short-horizon operational risk Physical/transition risk, asset resilience
Fraud risk assessment Identifies fraud schemes mapped to processes and roles COSO Fraud Risk Management Guide 2016 · IIA Without fraud expertise Procurement, payments, fuel, payroll

No new verification items are introduced by this change — the standing list applies unchanged (IEC 31010:2019 annex letters, IEC 61882, IEC 60812, IEC 61025, IEC 62502, IEC 62740, IEC 60300-3-11, ISO 22301, ISO 37301, ISO 37500, ISO 45001, ISO 55001, ISO/IEC 27005, and ISO 31000:2018 at 6.3.3, 6.4.2 and 6.6). If useful, the next step is to turn this into a single deliverable document with a short selection flowchart on top.